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1984] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
dants avoids conflict with the policy of noninterference.3 5 It is sub-
mitted, however, that in view of the delicacy of the balance struck
by the Court in harmonizing declaratory relief with these policies,
the Court's refusal to address the propriety of reopening the crimi-
nal court judgment 6 is problematic. It is submitted that the Court
should have answered this issue in the negative, since such reopen-
ing would pose a dangerous risk of violating the policies against
delay in criminal trials and review of prior adjudications. It is
hoped that, when a future declaratory judgment is rendered under
the Erlbaum rule, the Court will allow the judgment to be re-
opened only in the most limited circumstances so as not to render
inappropriate an otherwise innovative and valid solution to a
pressing problem.
Catherine A. Brienza
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
Article 55--Appeals Generally
CPLR 5522: Appellate division lacks discretion to grant relief to a
defendant failing to take timely appeal, absent a united and in-
severable interest with a successful appellant
CPLR 5522 provides appellate courts with broad discretion to
fashion relief appropriate to the particular equities of a case before
them. This discretion is limited by the general rule that an appel-
"See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The Erlbaum Court expressly stated that
any declaration issued will not be determinative of the ongoing criminal proceeding. 59
N.Y.2d at 155, 451 N.E.2d at 157, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 399. Therefore, the criminal trial will not
be interfered with even if the ruling is found to have been incorrect. Id.
11 59 N.Y.2d at 152 n.3, 451 N.E.2d at 155 n.3, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397 n.3.
37 See CPLR 5522 (1978). CPLR 5522 provides in pertinent part that "[a] court to
which an appeal is taken may reverse, affirm, or modify, wholly or in part, any judgment, or
order before it, as to any party." Id. This rule is derived from subdivision 1 of CPA section
584, Civil Practice Act, ch. 925, § 584, [1920] N.Y. Laws 205, and is identical to article VI,
section 8 of the New York Constitution. 7 WK&M 5522.02 (1982); see CPLR 5522, com-
mentary at 221 (1978). The purpose of the rule is to allow appellate courts to "render
whatever decree the justice of the case requires." SECOND REP. at 339, 340; CPLR 5522,
commentary at 222 (1978); see, e.g., Ferrari v. Johnson & Johnson, 42 App. Div. 2d 940, 940,
348 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139-40 (1st Dep't 1973) (reviewing court could require plaintiff's attorney
to pay costs to defendants for causing delay); Copp v. Bowser, 22 App. Div. 2d 105, 109, 254
N.Y.S.2d 200, 203 (3d Dep't 1964) (concept of fairness mandated new trial as to jury verdict
against motorist when lower court incorrectly held accident victim had no claim against
truck driver); SIEGEL § 543, at 759; 7 WK&M I 5522.02, at 55-183 (1982). Generally, the
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late court cannot grant relief for the benefit of a non-appealing
party.38 The law has remained unsettled, however, as to whether
the benefits of review may inure to a nonappellant when his co-
defendant wins a reversal on an error applicable to the defenses of
both parties.3 9 Recently, in Hecht v. City of New York,4 ° the Court
of Appeals held that the appellate division is without discretion to
grant relief to a defendant who failed to undertake a timely appeal
absent a united and inseverable interest with the successful
appellate court may do whatever the trial judge could have done. CPLR 5522, commentary
at 222 (1978); O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 471, 131 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1956). The
appellate division is also empowered to modify a jury award that it deems insufficient or
excessive by having the party adversely affected elect between stipulating to a modification
or facing a new trial. O'Connor, 309 N.Y. at 473, 131 N.E.2d at 887; 7 WK&M 1 5522.02, at
55-183 (1982).
88 See Hegger v. Green, 646 F.2d 22, 30 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Statella v. Robert
Chuckrow Constr. Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 669, 671, 281 N.Y.S.2d 215, 218 (1st Dep't 1967));
Schultz v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 201 N.Y. 230, 234, 94 N.E. 601, 602 (1911);
St. John v. Andrews Inst. for Girls, 192 N.Y. 382, 386, 85 N.E. 143, 144 (1908), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Smithsonian Inst. v. St. John, 214 U.S. 19 (1909). CPLR 5522 is not
considered the "central authority for the court's jurisdiction and powers of review," rather,
it delineates the options a reviewing court has in a case before it. See CPLR 5522, commen-
tary at 222 (1978). The scope of an appellate court's review power is set forth in CPLR 5501.
See CPLR 5501 (1978). Specifically, the appellate division has the competency to examine
both questions of law and fact. See id. 5501(c), commentary at 30.
To commence an appeal as of right, a party must file notice of appeal within 30 days
after being served with a copy of the judgment or order with notice of its entry. Id. 5513.
This time limit is strictly enforced. See Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
291 N.Y. 254, 255, 52 N.E.2d 421, 421 (1943) (per curiam) (an untimely appeal will be dis-
missed even if the parties agreed to an extension). See generally SIEGEL § 534, at 743.
39 Compare Schultz v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 201 N.Y. 230, 234-35, 94
N.E. 601, 602 (1911) (only appellant servant benefitted from reversal of judgment for false
imprisonment; non-appealing master remained vicariously liable) and Frankel v. Berman, 10
App. Div. 2d 838, 839, 199 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (1st Dep't 1960) (benefit of appeal by third-
party defendants did not run to non-appealing defendant despite failure by plaintiff to es-
tablish cause of action) and Bonat v. Crosswell, 241 App. Div. 230, 231, 271 N.Y.S. 582, 583
(1st Dep't 1934) (although plaintiff failed to prove default on lien by any of the defendants,
reversal would inure only to defendant who appealed) with Manning v. Joseph, 304 N.Y.
278, 281, 107 N.E.2d 446, 447 (1952) (city engineers denied extra compensation by comptrol-
ler received additional wages although only one appealed) and Arnold v. District Council
No. 9, Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Traders, 61 App. Div. 2d 748, 749, 401 N.Y.S.2d 811,
813 (1st Dep't 1978) (since lack of jurisdiction applied equally to all defendants, judgment
would be overturned even as to defendants who failed to seek review), appeal dismissed, 45
N.Y.2d 732, 380 N.E.2d 329, 408 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 46 N.Y.2d
999, 389 N.E.2d 830, 416 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1979). Reversal has been permitted to benefit non-
appealing tortfeasors. See, e.g., Statella v. Chuckrow Constr. Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 669, 670,
281 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217-18 (1st Dep't 1967); see Monahan v. Fiore, 76 App. Div. 2d 884, 884,
428 N.Y.S.2d 717, 717-18 (2d Dep't 1980) (mem.).
40 60 N.Y.2d 57, 454 N.E.2d 527, 467 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1983).
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appellant.41
In Hecht, the Supreme Court, New York County found the
defendants, Square Depew Garage Corporation and the City of
New York, equally liable for negligence for breaching a duty to
maintain a sidewalk in reasonable repair.42 The Appellate Division,
First Department, vacated the jury verdict, holding that, as a mat-
ter of law, there was no actionable defect in the sidewalk.4 3 Al-
though only the City had appealed, the First Department deter-
mined that the dismissal had to be extended to the defendant
corporation as well.44 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated
the judgment against the garage, holding that a judgment against a
non-appellant may not be vacated absent a united and inseverable
interest with the successful appellant. 5
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge Cooke began with
the general rule that since an appellate court may render relief to a
party "properly before it," reversal of a judgment cannot inure to
the benefit of a non-appealing coparty.46 Appellate courts, Chief
Judge Cooke found, have neither the statutory nor constitutional
authority to exercise discretionary power over a party who did not
appeal. 47 Only in cases where the interests of the parties are united
41 Id. at 62, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
42 Id. at 60-61, 454 N.E.2d at 529, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
43 Hecht v. City of New York, 89 App. Div. 2d 524, 525, 452 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (1st
Dep't 1982), modified, 60 N.Y.2d 57, 64, 454 N.E.2d 527, 531, 467 N.Y.S.2d 187, 191 (1983).
In his dissent, Justice Kupferman asserted that the sidewalk had been negligently main-
tained. 89 App. Div. 2d at 525, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 445 (Kupferman, J., dissenting). Since the
sidewalk was used mainly by cars entering the garage, be determined that the garage was
eighty percent at fault and the city twenty percent. Id. (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
44 89 App. Div. 2d at 524, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 444. The First Department reasoned that,
under CPLR 5501, the whole of the judgment was before it, and, therefore, any determina-
tion it made on the issue of liability would necessarily affect the defendant garage as well.
Id. at 525, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
45 60 N.Y.2d at 62-63, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190. The Court affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint against the City of New York, agreeing with the appellate divi-
sion that the alleged defect could "only be described as trivial." Id. at 61, 454 N.E.2d at 529,
467 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
40 Id. at 61-62, 454 N.E.2d at 529-30, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 189-90. The scope of review, the
Court noted, is ordinarily limited to those aspects of the judgment that have been appealed
and that aggrieve the appealing party. Id. at 61, 454 N.E.2d at 529, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
47 Id. at 63, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190. The Court pointed out that the
statutory predecessors to CPLR 5522 were intended to abrogate the common-law rule that
an error as to one party mandated reversal as to all parties. Id. at 63-64, 454 N.E.2d at 530-
31, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190-91. These provisions, Chief Judge Cooke declared, were not in-
tended to expand the jurisdiction of an appellate court or its scope of review. Id. Relief to a
non-appellant is permissible, the Court found, only when necessary to effectuate complete
relief to the successful appellant. Id. at 64, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
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and inseverable may the non-appellant receive full relief. 4 The
Court concluded that as joint tortfeasors, the City and the corpora-
tion were jointly and severally liable; thus, the benefit of the ap-
peal would redound exclusively to the appellant City.49
The Court of Appeals in Hecht, it is submitted, unnecessarily
inhibited appellate discretion to provide relief, resulting in an in-
equitable result for a party who foregoes an appeal. The garage in
Hecht not only remained liable for negligence despite a holding
that there was no violation of a legal duty, but also lost its right to
contribution from the City. 0 Thus, although the Court of Appeals
found that the appellate division lacked the authority to grant re-
lief to a nonappellant, the Court's reversal of the judgment against
the City necessarily involved the exercise of authority over the
non-appellant garage through the elimination of the garage's rights
to contribution. This narrow interpretation of the statute, it is sug-
gested, contradicts the governing principle of CPLR 5522-to pro-
vide the flexibility necessary to render a just result.
48 Id. at 62, 454 N.E.2d at 529-30, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 189-90. The Court declined to enu-
merate the specific instances where relief to a non-appellant would be necessary. Id. Other
courts have noted that a joint interest among or between co-parties is united and insever-
able. See, e.g., St. John v. Andrews Inst. for Girls, 192 N.Y. 382, 386, 85 N.E. 143, 144 (1908)
(dictum) (joint judgment against partners or joint obligors must either be affirmed as to co-
litigants or reversed), appeal dismissed sub nom, Smithsonian Inst. v. St. John, 214 U.S. 19
(1909).
4" 60 N.Y.2d at 62-63, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190. Since each defendant is
individually liable for the entire judgment, the Court reasoned, the garage's interest was
severable from that of the City. Id.
10 See id. at 60-61, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (city and garage were found
by the trial court to be equally liable). As a tortfeasor, the non-appellant garage in Hecht
was still liable for the entire judgment when its co-party was released from liability, see id.
at 64, 454 N.E.2d at 531, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (1983); Statella v. Chuckrow Constr. Co., 28
App. Div. 2d 669, 670, 281 N.Y.S.2d 215, 218 (1st Dep't 1967), since plaintiff is entitled to
recover from any tortfeasor the total amount of compensable damage incurred, see Klinger
v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d 362, 367, 361 N.E.2d 974, 978, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326 (1977); Kelly v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855
(1972); Schlimneyer v. Yurkiw, 80 Misc. 2d 226, 227-28, 363 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62-63 (Sup. Ct.
Sullivan County 1974), aff'd mem., 50 App. Div. 2d 616, 374 N.Y.S.2d 427 (3d Dep't 1975);
CPLR 1404, commentary at 381 (1976). Once the City was released from liability, however,
the garage could no longer seek contribution from the City for any payment it was to make
on the judgment. See Mulligan v. New York University, 254 App. Div. 107, 110, 3 N.Y.S.2d
982, 984 (1st Dep't 1938); CPLR 5522, commentary at 33 (McKinney Supp. 1983); see also
United States Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Powers, 233 N.Y. 143, 155, 135 N.E. 225, 228
(1922). This inequitable result, it is submitted, also appears to pose a threat to the defend-
ant who fails to appeal when a party he has impleaded for indemnification has successfully
challenged an appeal for plaintiff below. See CPLR 5522, commentary at 223-24 (1978);
Failing to Appeal Denies Defendant Fruits of Co-Defendant's Appellate Victory, N.Y.S.
LAw DIG., Sept. 1983 [hereinafter cited as Failing to Appeal].
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As the Hecht Court noted, the statutory antecedents to CPLR
5522 were intended to abrogate the common-law rule that an error
requiring reversal as to one party mandated reversal as to other
parties. 51 Ironically, had the common-law rule been in effect it
would have worked a more equitable result. Since it is clear that
the legislature intended to provide the appellate courts with
greater discretion, rather than reduce their authority over parties
to the judgment, the Court's declaration that the appellate division
lacked authority to determine the liability of the garage is
unwarranted.
The statute is arguably ambiguous on its face52 and previous
judicial interpretations have not been entirely consistent.5 The
Court of Appeals cited no policy reasons for its decision, but relied
instead on the blanket assertion that neither statutory nor consti-
tutional authority is vested in appellate courts to exercise discre-
tionary power over a party who failed to pursue appellate review.54
5, See 60 N.Y.2d at 64, 454 N.E.2d at 531, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 191; Geraud v. Stagg, 10
How. Pr. 369, 373 (N.Y.C. C.P. Genita County 1855). At common law, judgments were re-
garded as inseverable and entire. See Harmon & Harmon v. Brotherson, 1 Denio 537, 540
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Rochester County 1845); Sheldon v. Quinlen, 5 Hill 441, 442-43 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Utica County 1843). Since a judgment was entire, a reversible error as to one party
would require reversal as to all, irrespective of the error's relevance to their defenses or
theories of liability. See Sheldon, 5 Hill at 442; Cruikshank v. Gardner, 2 Hill 333, 334-35
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1842); Comment, Judgments Against Joint Tort-
feasors-Problems Arising on Appeal By Only One Defendant, 31 Mo. L. REv. 141, 142
(1966).
Section 278 of the original Code of Procedure (the Field Code) vested appellate courts
with authority to reverse, affirm or modify a judgment before it. Code of Procedure, ch. 379,
§ 278, [1848] N.Y. Laws 547-48 (current version at CPLR 5522 (1978)). Although this provi-
sion did not mention parties, see id., it was interpreted as a codification of the common-law
rule that reversal as to one required reversal as to all, see Farrell v. Calkins, 10 Barb. 348,
353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. Chenango County 1851). In 1849, the Code of Procedure was
amended to permit appellate courts to alter a lower court decision "as to any or all of the
parties." Code of Procedure, ch. 438, § 330, [1849] N.Y. Laws 681 (current version at CPLR
5522 (1978)). This amendment was interpreted as an attempt to abrogate the common-law
doctrine by allowing courts to modify judgments without affecting all co-parties. See 60
N.Y.2d at 64, 454 N.E.2d at 531, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 191; Geraud v. Stagg, 10 How. Pr. 369,
372-73 (N.Y.C. C.P. N.Y. County 1855). With the enactment of the CPLR, the statute was
modified slightly to authorize disposition of an appeal "as to any party." CPLR 5522 (1978).
52 CPLR 5522 provides that an appellate court may alter "any judgment, or order
before it, as to any party." CPLR 5522 (1978) (emphasis added). Although the Hecht Court
rejected the view that the term "any party" encompasses a non-appealing party, see 60
N.Y.2d at 63, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190, it is suggested that the statute could
fairly be read to include any party to the action, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
53See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
" See 60 N.Y.2d at 63, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190; supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text. As a matter of policy, it may be suggested that the overburdened courts
1984]
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The authority of this premise, however, is diminished by the
Court's declaration that under certain circumstances such power
must be exercised. 5 Indeed, there seems to be little reason not to
extend the exception to cases of joint and several liability where
the non-appellant will be deprived of his right to contribution and
the error on appeal is applicable to the defenses of both parties.5
Permitting appellate courts the discretion to fashion such relief
would not be inconsistent with the language of the statute and
would promote the efficient administration of justice.5 7
James Schwartzman
have no interest in encouraging an appeal by defendants who are willing to accept a judg-
ment. See Failing to Appeal, supra note 50.
5 See 60 N.Y.2d at 62, 454 N.E.2d at 530, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 190; supra note 45 and
accompanying text. It should be noted that reviewing courts have extended the benefits of
an appeal to non-appealing litigants who were members of a class of litigants. See Manning
v. Joseph, 304 N.Y. 278, 281, 107 N.E.2d 446, 447 (1952); Union Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Cole,
198 App. Div. 539, 540, 190 N.Y.S. 858, 859 (1st Dep't 1921). The appellate division has also
made exceptions to the general rule against reviewing questions not formally before it on
appeal. See, e.g., Resnick v. Levine, 80 App. Div. 2d 699, 699-700, 436 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (3d
Dep't 1981) (mem.) (award of damages for unjust enrichment modified although issue not
raised); People ex rel. Schick v. Marvin, 246 App. Div. 71, 72, 283 N.Y.S. 203, 204 (4th Dep't
1935) (appellate court must consider whether there is a right of appeal even if the issue was
not raised in arguments), rev'd on other grounds, 271 N.Y. 219, 2 N.E.2d 634 (1936), aff'd,
275 N.Y. 587, 11 N.E.2d 767 (1937).
56 Cf. In re Union Trust Co., 219 N.Y. 537, 541, 114 N.E. 1048, 1049 (1916). In Union
Trust, the surrogate court had awarded 20 equal shares of a testator's trust fund to his
grandchildren and great grandchildren. Id. at 539, 114 N.E. at 1048. Only one of the distrib-
utees, a grandchild, actually appealed the decision to the appellate division. Id. The appel-
late court declared that only the eight grandchildren were entitled to shares. Id. at 540, 114
N.E. at 1048. Instead of granting a one-eighth share to each of the grandchildren, the appel-
late division gave the appellant grandchild a one-eighth share, and each of the 19 remaining
distributees who did not appeal was awarded an equal share of the remainder. Id., 114 N.E.
at 1049. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment. Id. at 541, 114 N.E. at
1049. The Court reasoned that since the non-appellant grandchildren, although otherwise
entitled to a one-eighth share, would have to "co-operate in complying with the judgment of
[the appellate] court by suffering a reduction of the amount which otherwise they would
have received under the decree of the Surrogate," they were entitled to receive the fruits of
the appeal. Id.
W Other jurisdictions permit appellate courts in similar cases to fashion appropriate
relief for parties who do not appeal. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr.
Co., 46 Cal. 2d. 423, 433 n.8, 296 P.2d 801, 811 n.8 (1956); E & K Agency, Inc. v. Van Dyke,
60 N.J. 160, 163, 286 A.2d 706, 708 (1972); Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d 603, 610
& n.9 (Wyo. 1978). In E & K Agency, the Supreme Court of New Jersey explained the
rationale for granting appellate courts broader discretion:
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction a reviewing court has the power and
indeed the duty to make such ultimate disposition of the case as justice requires.
Here it has been finally held, after being twice heard at the trial level and twice
1984] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 50.20: Transactional immunity should not be granted to a
witness without conformance to the procedures mandated under
the statute providing the immunity
In order to elicit testimony from a witness who refuses to tes-
tify by invoking his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation,58 a prosecutor may request that a "competent authority"59
reviewed on appeal, that plaintiff's claim is groundless. The basis for the asserted
contention against each defendant is the same. It would indeed be a travesty of
justice were plaintiff to be allowed to satisfy a substantial claim of this nature
against one defendant when the courts of the State have gone to no small pains to
reach a deliberate determination that the claim is without merit. Appellate courts
of this State, in line with those of many others, have recognized the responsibility
of appellate review as including a requirement that the ultimate disposition of a
case be just, not only as to parties directly before the reviewing court but also as
to others who will perforce be affected by the action of the court.
60 N.J. at 164-65, 286 A.2d at 709.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. The New York State Consti-
tution also prohibits compelled testimonial self-incrimination. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. His-
torically, the privilege against self-incrimination grew out of opposition to practices such as
those of the Star Chamber of several centuries ago, which often compelled subjects to admit
guilt. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974). The fifth amendment embodies,
among other things, "our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhu-
mane treatment and abuses." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). Al-
though protection of the individual is a compelling reason for this privilege, the primary
policy behind it is the preservation of the integrity of a judicial system based on innocence.
Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
A witness asserts the privilege by refusing to answer specific questions while on the
stand. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d
418, 427, 235 N.E.2d 439, 444, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 470, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968). A
defendant, however, waives the privilege against self-incrimination if he takes the stand. See
3 C. ToncrA, WHARTON'S CRInNAL PROCEDURE § 401, at 61 (12th ed. 1975). When a claim of
privilege is made by a witness, three requirements must be satisfied. First, the testimony
must be compelled. See, e.g., United States v. De Lorenzo, 151 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1945).
A voluntary offer of testimony is construed as a waiver and will not be privileged. See id. at
124-25. Second, the evidence must be testimonial. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 761 (1966). Third, the evidence must be incriminating, see, e.g., Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), and the witness must reasonably suspect that his answer
will incriminate him before he asserts the privilege, id.; see Commission of Social Servs. v.
Charles A.C., 72 App. Div. 2d 770, 770, 421 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (2d Dep't 1979). Thus, the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to testimony that
merely impairs the witness' reputation; the testimony must tend to expose him to criminal
prosecution. See id.; R. McNAmARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LaMITATIoNS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
13.11, at 209 (1982). Nevertheless, mere implication of injurious effects on a witness' crimi-
nal liability from the response is all that the trial judge need find to uphold the privilege.
See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87.
89 See CPL § 50.30 (1981). A request by the district attorney that the court confer
